Tackling

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Chapter 7

Tackling Islamic Terrorism and Radicalism in Indonesia by Increasing the Sense of Humanity and Friendship

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ABSTRACT

In regard to the rise of Islamic terrorism and fundamentalism, this paper aims to (1) explore the ways in changing jihadists' mind and behavior; that is, by guiding them away from "war situation" and by persuading them to conduct good deeds and to relate Islam to daily life such as by giving sermons on peace or helping others. To the convicted terrorists, the authors present the project findings showing that developing dialogs about humanity and peace could increase the level of cognitive complexity through which it can lead them to be more positive to others. (2) The authors also discuss religious fundamentalism and how to deal with it. Two studies revealed that although eliminating religious fundamentalism is almost not possible, there are still ways to lead them to have positive perceptions toward other religious groups. One of them is to make the fundamentalists believe that Muslims and Islam perceive non-Muslims in a positive way, instead of in a negative way.

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INTRODUCTION

A recent report from the 2015 Global Terrorism Index (Combs, 2015) shows that Islamic terrorist groups are on the rise and have become a global threat. Before that, in early 2002 the United States Government declared that Southeast Asia is positioned as the second most vulnerable region toward terrorism (Acharya & Acharya, 2007) and (Tan, 2003). It is important to note that such acts of terrorism emerged in developed and developing countries, and also in Muslim and non-Muslim countries.

Due to its global and widespread movement, these terrorist groups require more personnel or new members. It is important to keep in mind that, although the current Islamic terrorist groups seem to be clustered and downgraded into cells, they keep a liaison to bridge with each other. This factor has made the terrorists connected and probably remained cohesive. Muslims targeted for recruitment and supporters are derived from fundamentalists, people who are convinced that Islamic state is the solution for social issues and see the Quran as the main source of truth and reference (Putra & Sukabdi, 2014).

Based on a social psychological approach, this paper aims to (1) understand the jihadists' mind and behavior in how they were involved in terrorism activities and why some of them decided to disengage from such activities and accept a peaceful path of Islam, and (2) discuss religious fundamentalism in Indonesia by demonstrating how jihadists can be led to have positive perceptions toward other religious groups. Here, the authors will present and elaborate those points in separate sections.

The phenomenon of Islamic terrorism can be studied through many perspectives. For example, socio-historical approach will look into the history of radical and hardliner Islamic groups movement and try to find the momentum why these groups emerged. Political scientists may start to find issues happening in local and global levels and how the political interest of these Islamic groups is in contradiction to other groups, causing political battles between hardliner Islamic groups and other groups. On the other hand, social psychologists hope to explain the psychological aspects and social context on why Muslims are willing to engage in or support acts of terror.

THE RISE OF ISLAMIC TERRORISM IN INDONESIA AND HOW TO DEAL WITH IT

The Rise of Islamic Terrorism Globally and in Indonesia

Studies regarding Islamic terrorism have found several factors which encourage a group to perform terror, both through violence or threats of violence. Several studies have found that acts of terror can be triggered by failure of the modern global economy in improving the welfare of countries with predominantly Muslim population. Other studies have claimed that the rise of terrorism is due to, among others, dominance of national identity on top of Islamic identity, disagreement toward certain political systems (i.e., democracy), Israeli occupation of Jerusalem, clash of Islam with other religions, and the power of secular government: see (Moghaddam, 2008) and (Robinson, Crenshaw, & Jenkins, 2006). Those issues are believed to have caused shame and have eliminate feelings of compassion in terrorists (Abdel-Khalek, 2004) and (Rothschild, Abdollahi, Pyszczynski, 2009). Terrorist groups feel that Muslims must be liberated from these adverse conditions. They believe that attacking in the name of Allah and religion is an honorable struggle to achieve the welfare of Muslims (Kruglanski, Chen, Dechesne, Fishman, & Orehek, 2009) and (Venkatraman, 2007).

Several research reports regarding Islamic terrorist groups and those who support them have explained that many Palestinian and Lebanese Muslims provided support to groups such as Hammas, Jihad Islam, and Hezbollah. Often, families of the perpetrators of terror also fully support their family members in performing suicide bombings (Kimhi & Even, 2004), (Moghaddam, 2006), and (Post, Sprinzak, & Denny, 2003). Due to this phenomenon, a survey was conducted in 14 countries (including Indonesia) to explain why Muslims support individuals or groups that struggle in the name of Islam although their action causes humanitarian and civil disaster (Fair & Shepherd, 2006). The result explained that the sense of threat by outsiders is a major contributor for these people in supporting acts of terror. From here, a new question arises: what kind of threat or sense of threat triggers someone to join or support radicalism and terrorist acts?

According to Henry and colleagues, there are two possible reasons for acts of terror performed by Islamic groups. First, different values between Islam and the West, or between Muslims and non-Muslims, become the stimulus for conflict of values. Second, the dominance of Western nations over Islamic nations causes inferiority in Islamic countries and this condition prompted reactions to counter Western dominance over Islam. To some extent, however, empirical data from their findings, i.e., (Henry et al., 2005) and (Sidanius et al., 2004) showed that clash of civilization between Islam and the West (including non-Muslims) was not the key to acts of terror and attack on the West and Israel. Instead, it was a counter-dominance project. Acts of terror performed by Islamic terrorist groups were due to their discontent with the Western countries' dominance over Muslim majority countries. These findings were also supported by studies conducted by Pape and Feldman (2010). For example, bombing actions in Iraq and Afghanistan became widespread and rampant after the US took power. From here, the subsequent question that arises is whether the findings by Henry et al. (2005) and Sidanius et al. (2004), which explained the rise of Islamic terrorism in the Middle East, are similar to the rise of Islamic terrorism in Indonesia?

Putra and Sukabdi (2013) found that the fundamental factors that cause Islamic acts of terror in Indonesia are different from those occurring in Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, or Afghanistan. The findings demonstrated that, in Indonesia, terrorism activities occurred based on two conditions, which were due to Western/foreign intervention and the various conflicts between Muslims and non-Muslims. An example of this can be seen in the Christmas Eve bombing in 2000, which occurred due to Muslim-Christian conflict in Ambon and Poso. On the other hand, the Bali bombing in 2002 is understood to be due to discontentment with foreign parties, in this case the US and its allies.

In addition to the above explanations, other issues that make the terrorist phenomenon in Indonesia different from those in the Middle East are social support factors. Families of terrorists in Indonesia often prevented acts of terrorism (Soheh & Zeena, 2009) and the majority of Muslims in Indonesia (as represented by Muslim organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah) condemned such violence. This situation is quite different than in the Middle East where perpetrators of terror are often supported by their families.

The results of focus group discussions and interviews to the so-called *jihadists conducted* by Putra and Sukabdi (2013) revealed that there are at least three social conditions which trigger terror actions by Islamic groups. First, it is a series of conflicts between Muslims and non-Muslims throughout the world. Second, it is believed that the political systems being implemented in Indonesia have failed. Third, it is believed that Muslims in Indonesia are politically and economically deprived. Moreover, it showed that acts of terror performed by Islamic groups in Indonesia depend on the considerations of whether Indonesia is in a state of war or not. If Indonesia is considered to be in a state of war, then acts of terror are likely to be performed as a consequence of war.

DISENGAGEMENT FROM TERRORISM

Humanity Approach and Post-Prison Programs

After knowing the reasons why terrorist activities occur in Indonesia and considering that there are a number of ex-terrorist prisoners or *jihadists*a, one question arises to consider how to deal with them. That is, how to make these *jihadists* move away from radical activities. In 2011 Sarwono and team started a project named as Post-Prison Program: Peace Propagation Empowerment Program[1].

Before the intervention research was conducted, the authors discussed why counter-ideology programs in Indonesia, including Sarwono's program, failed to change *jihadist* ideology. To understand this failure, it was necessary to understand Islamic thoughts. There are schools of thoughts in Islam, where each school of thoughts has unique interpretations about Islam. However, there is a consensus in Islam that, as far as the group still uses Quran and *Sunnah* (the living example of Muhammad), they can be called Muslims. Some Muslims even have the view that "differences in Islam are a grace". It is, then, when programs related to counter-ideology were conducted, the program usually would end with a *jihadist* statement such as "we respect your position by doing *jihad* without war. We don't blame your decision and interpretation; therefore, please respect our position of choosing *jihad fisabilillah* with arms. It is because we have chosen what we think is right!"

In order to avoid such failure, the new activities focused on trying to redirect their thinking and activities from "war situation" and doing *jihad fisabilillah* (holy war) with arms, by persuading them to conduct good deeds and to relate Islam to daily life such as by giving sermons on peace, helping orphans and underprivileged children, or writing about living a peaceful life.

The basic assumption is that ideology is not something carried from birth. Ideology is learned attitude that is formed through experience and/or an education and training process. Ideology is not absolute. Ideology can change from one group to another. But this does not apply to some people who regard their ideology as a revelation from God, instead of an option. To them, ideology is absolute and must be followed. However, even if it's difficult to change their ideology, they are still willing to listen to other people and change their views if it concerns the practice of Islam in daily life.

From the above assumption, Post-Prison program (PP) was conducted with the purpose of social and economic empowerment for former terrorists and former partisans of radical movements, so that they could return and have a role in society and not re-engage in violence. PP ran for four years, and had gathered 145 participants from nine provinces in Indonesia. Participants came from different backgrounds. They came from groups of ex-*mujahideen* in Afghanistan, Jemaah Islamiyah, Jamilurrahman, ex-*mujahideen* in the Phillippines, perpetrators in Ambon-Poso conflicts, former members of *Negara Islam Komando Wilayah 9* (NII-KW9), and ex-convicts of terrorism and subversion cases.

In 2011, the Post-Prison Program I (PP-I) was held with participants from six provinces, namely DKI Jakarta, West Java, Central Java, East Java, Maluku and East Kalimantan with a total of 50 participants. Classification of PP-I participants were ex-convicts of terrorism and subversion cases, and perpetrators in the Ambon conflict. The purpose of PP-I was to re-educate participants so that they could return to society and give contributions, especially in spreading Islamic values without violence. Participants were asked to do *da'wah* (preaching/teaching) about peaceful Islam. Next, PP-II was held in 2012, in DKI Jakarta, West Java, Central Java and East Java with 47 participants from groups of ex-*mujahideen* in Afghanistan and former members of NII-KW9. In PP-II, participants came from even more diverse backgrounds. Not only were they ex-perpetrators of terrorist acts, but they were also participants of

radical movement, which was NII-KW9. In PP-II, participants received re-education and economic empowerment. Findings from PP-I and PP-II showed that economic empowerment was able to change the behavior and attitude of participants (see Figure 1).

The positive outcome of PP-I and PP-II was the establishment of Forum Komunikasi Alumni Afghanistan Indonesia (FKAAI is Afghanistan Alumni in Indonesia Communication Forum), an organization with former *mujahideen* who fought in Afghanistan from 1980s to 1990s as members. FKAAI was formed by PP-I and PP-II participants. Some of the activities carried out by FKAAI showed a change in attitude and behavior of participants, from radical to more tolerant. Some examples were holding a meeting with members of Asosiasi Korban Bom dan Terorisme di Indonesia (ASKOBI is Association of Bomb Victims Indonesia), a statement of tolerance in Bundaran HI Jakarta, and celebration the independence day of Indonesia.

Small business training and economic capability development for participants were able to change their view of *jihad fi sabilillah* to *Islam rahmatan lil alamin*. Based on evaluations, participants still viewed their ideology as the truest, but they chose not to fight for it with violence and terror.

The results were surprisingly positive. The target group could potentially have a positive perspective about the world outside in which there are many problems that need to be addressed by other means besides *jihad/* holy war. In fact, our program could influence the participants to build a forum that refuses terrorism and violence.

Based on the findings of previous programs, PP-III was held in 2014 with the purpose of economic empowerment. Participants came from groups of ex-*mujahideen* in Afghanistan, Jemaah Islamiyah, Jamilurrahman, ex-*mujahideen* in the Philippines, perpetrators of the Poso conflict, and former members of NII-KW9 with 58 participants from DKI Jakarta, Central Java, West Java, East Java, Lampung and Central Sulawesi. The focus was more on soft skills training and getting economic assistance. In 2015, PP-IV was held with ex-convicts of terrorism cases as participants with 27 participants. The purpose of PP-IV was a disengagement program through economic empowerment. Participants were trained to have entrepreneurial ability and were re-educated so that they could function in society and not go back to their former communities (see Figure 2).

Figure 1. PP-1 activity, participants visited Buddhist Tzu Chi Foundation to see the pluralism Tzu Chi Flat

Figure 2. Cholily (right), a participant of PP IV, he run a clothes business and owns 1 store in Malang, East Java

Overall PPs had 145 participants, with various radical ideology backgrounds. The success rate of PP was at 98,62%. Furthermore, the success can also be seen in the participation to involve in peaceful Islam campaign in Bundaran HI (see Figure 3 and Figure 4), the participation to spread a peaceful Islam in a seminar (see Figure 5), and the works of PP participants regarding *da'wah Islam rahmatan lil alamin* (see Figure 6).

Success can also be seen from PP participants' disengagement from their former groups. Only two participants came back to their old group and commited acts of terror. It is considered that the advantage of PP was its humanistic approach to participants. Here, a humanistic approach is understood as an approach that emphasizes the notion that humans have various potentials within themselves and have the freedom to change according to their own choices. Based on this approach, terrorists are shown as having other potentials that, if developed, can bring benefits to themselves, to their groups and to society.

With these results, there were three things that differentiate Post-Prison Program from other deradicalization programs in Indonesia. First, the purpose of PP was re-education and economic empowerment of the participants. PP did not attempt to directly counter their ideology, and instead gave them social knowledge and entrepreneurial skills so that the participants gained an alternative viewpoint and the ability to function in soci[21]. This is considered different from counter-violent extremist programs, such as one developed by the National Agency for Combating Terrorism (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme/BNPT). For examples, BNPT has programs called Klinik (from the acronym Konsultasi Langsung Ideologi Negara In[23]esia Kesatuan, direct consultation towards Indonesian National ideology) Pancas[15] In Indonesia, Pancasila is the official philosophical foundation pillar of the country. It consists of 5 principles: 1) trust in God, 2) humanity, 3) national unity, 4) democracy, and 5) social justice. Most Islamic radicalists reject Pancasila ideology as it is understood to be made by humans. Through this program, BNPT attempted to plant an understanding that Pancasila is part of Islam. Nonetheless, as this planting was conducted through direct discussion, many meetings still ended up with a rejection to Pancasila ideology[2].

Figure 3. Peaceful Islam campaign in Bundaran HI (Head of FKAAI, Ahmad Sajuli)

Figure 4. Peaceful Islam campaign in Bundaran HI (PR officer of FKAAI, Maskur)

Second, PP used cultural approach in recruiting participants by utilizing a network of radical groups to recruit. Participants were invited and asked to join the intervention program through their families or partners that have joined PP before. This brought out feelings of appreciation and psychological closeness in participants. Third, joining PP was voluntary. There was no compulsion. Prospective participants had a right to refuse to join the program. Their participation was evidence that they had commitment and were interested in the intervention program. This approach is considered different from other programs. More often, other programs tended to use a legal approach in that convicted terrorists were forced to follow or comply with the programs they develop because this was set under prison regulation.

Figure 5. Participation in supporting peaceful Islam (Joko (right), participants of PP IV)

Figure 6. One of FKAAI works Menuju Indonesia Damai (Towards a Peaceful Indonesia)

Integrative Complexity and Extreme Behavior

In psychology, there is evidence showing the connection between aggression and cognition or mind. According to this, the more people stick to their own perceptions in responding to an issue or a topic, or the more simple (i.e. effortless) people think about an issue or a topic, thus the more aggressive they will be (see Bruch, McCann, & Harvey, 1991) and (Peterson, Doty, & Winter, 1993). Authoritarianism and attitudes toward contemporary social issues. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 19(2),

174-184., 1993). On the other hand, if people tend to be open or flexible to other people's statements, i.e., they think of a social issue in a complex way, they are likely to be less aggressive.

Integrative complexity is a psychological measure concerning simple or complex thoughts. It is a measurement of a person's cognition focusing on the structures of the statement or topic by ignoring the content. It examines how complex the structures of the statements are in response to a topic (Suedfeld, Tetlock, & Streufert, 1992). It consists of a 7-point scale, where 1 is categorized as undifferentiated strategy/simple thought and 7 is categorized as multiple-integration strategy/complex thought. For examples of the scores, see (Suedfeld, 1996, p. 180):

- **Undifferentiated (Score = 1):** I know what my values are and do not need to gather more information in order to form an opinion or decide what to do. The appropriate action to take is very clear-cut. I am able to respond quickly and decisively. I am quite certain about how I feel and may rely on rules which I have established for myself or that others follow. It is not the right time for trying to get all the facts or details of a situation or to listen to a lot of other people's opinions. It is just really not necessary to completely analyze the entire situation and what my behaviour should be.
- **Differentiated, Not Integrated (Score = 3):** It is important to analyze things a bit before deciding how I feel or what to do. There may be more than one viewpoint which is worth considering, or more than one aspect of the situation which is important. It may be important to recognize other people's needs or points of view. Jumping to conclusions will probably not work out too well. Rules which I have established may need to be modified depending on the situation.
- **Differentiated, Some Integration (Score = 5):** It is necessary to analyze the situation so that I clearly understand the different aspects of it. It may also be important to look at other people's views or feelings. Once I understand the situation I will l try to take as much information into account in deciding how to behave or what to say or do as is possible. I may try to come up with a novel approach or a creative solution which encompasses all the important factors or viewpoints. I will be flexible and willing to incorporate new information or ideas.
- **Differentiation, Multi-level Integration (Score = 7):** It is necessary to examine the situation fully so that I can clearly understand all the relevant information and am able to consider it in making the best possible decision. I will need to compare the possible outcomes of a variety of different courses of action, and thus systematically derive the best outcome. It is not enough to merely combine different points of view; instead I will analyze the problem on a number of different levels (e.g., examine it historically) and combine the points of view on each level to achieve an overall understanding of the situation and how a solution would fit into the overall picture. I will come to the best solution by making numerous compromises among different point s of view.

In relation to terrorism, terrorist groups were found to be associated with the low score of integrative complexity. Their rhetoric ways tend to be more simple than non-terrorist groups (Conway, Gornick, Houck, Togwood, & Conway, 2011). Instead, when a terrorist group is considered extremely savage, the score of integrative complexity is lower than other terrorist groups. A study conducted by Houck, Repke, and Conway (2016) found this trend. The study demonstrated that, after the split of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) from Al Qaeda, and after terrorist activities of ISIS were considered more and more brutal compared to Al Qaeda, the cognitive complexity of ISIS members tended to drop significantly less high as compared to Al Qaeda.

The question remains: what has made ISIS more brutal than its predecessor? Is it possible that ISIS tends to dehumanize other groups that are different from them even though they are categorized as Muslims or peaceful non-Muslims? A study analyzing ISIS discourse in Islamic radical media online supports this assumption (Erikha, Putra, & Sarwono, 2016). Erikha et al. (2016) analyzed two Islamic radical online media in Indonesia, Arrahmah and VOA-Islam. In the beginning of reporting news about ISIS, from August 2014 to February 2015, they put their position as the supporter of ISIS. However, from February 2015 until now, Arrahmah reports about ISIS have changed to criticize and oppose ISIS. On the other hand, VOA-Islam consistently supports ISIS. Erikha et al. (2016) revealed that, for Arrahmah, there is a moral path or corridor in fighting for the glory of Islam. For example, Muslim "warriors" have to ensure the safety of peaceful non-Muslims and not kill other Muslim fellows despite having different interpretations about Islam. In this way, for Arrahmah, ISIS has been considered to be out of the Islamic corridor. Therefore, their movements have to be opposed.

In addition, influenced by these findings and considerations, under the direction of Sarlito W. Sarwono, the study set a series of meetings with convicted terrorists by highlighting the themes of discussion related to humanity, peace, and intergroup harmony. The idea was that if we could build dialogs related to humanity, peace, and intergroup harmony and put away the concentrations of the convicted about war and *jihad*, their level of integrative complexity would increase.

It is important to note that this activity is different from counter-narrative programs, which are set for countering radical narrations in a direct way (see for example Ramakrishna, 2016). Instead of setting the new narratives to oppose radical narratives, the study tended to lead and ask the convicted terrorists to discuss humanity and peace, what they think or feel about peace, and whether there is any human who would not want to live peacefully? If the nature of human is good and kind, is it possible for us to build peace? Thus, what was done in this study was more about avoiding an argument with their ideology and trying to raise their sense of humanity.

In the preliminary project, four prisons were chosen: Cipinang prison in Jakarta, Kedung Pane Prison in Semarang, Batu prison in Nusakambangan, and Porong prison in Sidoarjo. The meetings were moderated by selected religious clerics who were trained to build discussions with convicted terrorists who are usually sensitive with strangers and to develop a dialog where everybody can share their perceptions or feelings, and also to avoid leading an argument or conclusion such as claiming the convicted person as a bad person.

Four meetings, set monthly in each prison, were successfully held. Most meetings were set with different themes, as follows:

- **The Aperture:** In order to build positive rapport, the team began the dialog with talks about everyday life, family, and current issues in prison. An example of dialog introduction:

… we came here, to obtain answers, or talk, or objectively and accurately discuss from the first person […]. I did not come here to patronize, […] so we can do light talk and prioritizing objectivity. (Prof. Asep Usmar Ismail – Batu Prison, 23 January 2016)

- **Discussions on 'Takfiri' and Refusal of Violence:** This meeting focused on discussing how developing peaceful activities are possible. An example of the stimulating statement:

[…] There is a hadith by Rasulullah PBUH, judging others as infidel when they believe that there is no God but Allah, there is no worship other than Allah, then the denouncer is an infidel. So in conclusion denouncing others as infidels cannot be done lightly, it cannot be easily done and should be done carefully (Prof. Asep Usmar Ismail –Cipinang Prison, 1 March 2016)

- **Renouncing Violence and Promoting Peace:** Subsequent to previously presented topics, participants were invited to be an agent of peace resolution.

[T]hat is why we now talk of peace, if we look at the example of Nelson Mandela, we talk about the future. The future is actually ahead, so it is not the past. We actually learn about the past from the past because the past has both good and bad, we are studying today to plan for the future, something like that. […] So when he was in prison at that time, he also formulated what the future would probably be like, so what is it in the scenario that made him say yes, this is what I think is important, we are also developing this in Indonesia. Now, in a conflict everyone loses no one wins, but we actually want a solution, we look to the future, we see a better Indonesia. So yeah, we have to learn about the differences, this is what I think, […] Maybe there is an opinion please sir, maybe there are different opinions, it's okay, we are having a light discussion, how was it in Poso, Tentena and also other places. (Dr. Ichsan Malik – Porong Prison, 28 March 2016)

- **Conclusion:** The moderators would make a resume of all topics discussed. Examples of closing dialogs delivered:

[…]Alhamdulillah this is more than what we hope for, we can have a fairly lengthy discussion and we believe it will not end here. God willing (insyallah) when there is another opportunity, with a different format, but I hope you have done your sentence. When I see you again, it is complete, it is done. We meet outside, I often meet others who have gone out. […] I hope Allah gives us guidance (hidayah) to us […] (Prof. Syafi'i Mufid –Kendungpane Prison, 13 April 2016).

Fifty-nine statements were randomly collected from 38 convicted terrorists. Across four meetings, the findings yielded an increase in the level of integrative complexity. It turned out that the first meeting was at the lowest level of integrative complexity. This indicates that highlighting the discussion about humanity and peace may reduce aggressive intensions and intolerant perceptions. This finding, of course, is considered important for disengagement programs of terrorism.

Family as Agent of Change of Terrorism Disengagement: A Proposal

Along with the approach used to disengage participants from terrorist activities, the authors also consider the use of the jihadist's wife as the agent of change. Conflict in Syria and the phenomenon of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have brought a new model of how Muslims join and support a terrorist group like ISIS. Before ISIS, for an example in Afghanistan, from the mid-1980s through early 1990s, war between Mujahidin and Russia, Muslims from outside Afghanistan who joined the fight against Russia were mostly males. At the time of this writing, it was not only males who joined the fight with ISIS in Syria. Some of them were females (Saltman, 2016) or with all family members, including children. They came to Syria as they see ISIS as a hope in establishing Islamic law (Erikha, Putra, & Putra,

2016). Moreover, as women used as martyrs are getting more common and are understood to be highly influential for the children's values and moral development, embracing wives to be part of counter violent extremism programs is considered important.

Our research, interviewing 10 wives of convicted terrorists, found that most wives did not support the use of violence. From the interviews conducted from February to April 2016, it was found that all ten wives claimed they never knew the activities of their husband outside the house, especially things related to terrorism acts. What they did know was that if the husband was away or didn't come home for a some time, it was for *ta'lim*, trading, or doing other things to earn a living. They were surprised when they first found out the husband was arrested. But there was one wife (IP from Solo) who admitted that she already had a feeling when there was news about an arrest in Aceh, while her husband had not been home for a long time.

[…] I came home at 11, and finally I got a call from home, saying my husband was arrested. I was surprised, why arrested, I didn't know, when he left he told me it was for work. Working, I work in Irian. Oh, and every time he called the number always changed, whenever I called back it didn't connect. I wasn't too suspicious because I was not, but, after some time he kept changing, finally he said he went to Sulawesi. (B, 33)

We didn't know, because the reason he went was to go to Solo, where to, he went bringing his things, to my knowledge it was just for business.[…] We did't understand what his activities was like. (NJ, 43)

Me, that time what I knew was, because my husband told me he wanted to go Umrah, then trading. So from there we only stayed at home, not going anywhere. (R, 40)

Again, from the ten wives interviewed, all of them agreed that terrorism was not good, not a commendable act. But there were three wives who refused to call their husbands terrorists. NJ in West Java said her husband only helped finance, UH said her husband was not a terrorist, and IP from Central Java said the acts committed by her husband were part of his idealism, which was natural to him and she would not want to prohibit it. IP believed that whatever her husband had done or will do, he would have had considered the good or bad, and she did not have the right to forbid it. Seven other wives said firmly that they did not agree to the things done by their husbands, and if their husband did those things, it was due to influences from their surroundings, while the wives could not reach all their husbands' friends. These seven wives said that any form of violence is wrong, and Islam does not teach violence to the people. A from Jogja said that the actions done by her husband could also be her fault, that she could not guard her husband from bad environment. From those seven wives, two of them, F from Semarang and Z from Porong, married their husbands when they were already in prison and serving their sentence. F and Z admitted that they were willing to marry their husbands because their Ustad introduced them, and these convicts were introduced as *mujahid* fighting in Allah's way, and to their knowledge, the husband would be out of prison soon.

Well even though my knowledge of religion is not that good, but if you hurt other people, then that's wrong. Allah can't possibly tell us to do wrong things. So yeah, I can't understand why people terrorize with bombs, what is it they're looking for? (B, 33)

Well it's okay,I don't know what else to do. This is talking about idealism. My husband, if his idealism is on, there's that, what can I do. Yes I know, it's wrong, but what else, it's his idealism, if he thinks it's right, well go right ahead. I accept this as my fate. Truth be told, I feel much calmer with my current situation. I just accept it. (IP, 29)

Disappointment is there, but not regret. This is called a test, what does he mean, I don't even know. I can't speak if he said I'm fighting for my religion, I can't talk anymore. Oh well, what's important is it's not a weird case like drugs, like murder, like that, I don't, I mean if's it's like that then we don't know, that's because fighting for religion, so I... I even feel like proud to have a husband like that, I mean, he's in there because he was fighting for religion. (Z, 17)

All ten wives wished that their husbands could be freed immediately. Nine of them said that they didn't want the husbands to repeat their actions, and that they would make sure that their husbands wouldn't get influenced by bad environment anymore. Even A from Jogja intended to move to a far away place, to keep him from their current environment. But one of them, IP, said that she would not forbid her husband if he wanted to do the same actions again, because for her, that's the right of her husband, and she would not interfere.

Well what we can do at least is control his peers, that's the clearest thing […]When we were together there were no problems. I mean like this, we get him away from his old friends. We take him somewhere, like my mom's who lives far away. So we can move there. (F, 37)

Actually if there's grace from God I want to buy a house far away from Solo or Jogja. If there's the fortune, I want it to be in Batam. (A, 28)

What can I say, […] I never give him permission. My husband doesn't have that kind of aspiration, I mean I told my husband don't be like that, it's still peaceful, you still have family, children to feed. (Z, 17)7)

Most wives were future-oriented, desiring to educate and raise their children. All of them had the desire to send their children to the highest education level, and wanted them to become *hafid-hafidzoh*. Interestingly, from all the wives interviewed, not one wanted their children to become policemen. Most of them wanted the children to be *Tahfidz* (people who memorize the Quran), technocrats, or anything they desire, but not the police. This was because they felt that they received bad treatment from the police, especially during arrests or during a visit to the prison.

Well don't, his father was arrested by the police, why should he wanted to be a police? (IP, 29)

Right now we know life is not safe anymore, many bad influence for children. I mean so that the focus is to there, to be a hafidz, so he understands what inside the Quran. (Z, 17)

My regret is this, entering Mako Prison in Kelapa Dua, oh dear God. When he was still 6 months. In here it's better, but there, oh God, never again. That's my regret, one year in there. To my husband, don't go there anymore, never again. Like that. Only to my own husband. It was his doing. I can't blame anybody else. (A, 28)

The wives hoped that they could raise their children with their husbands. There were some plans for the future, among others to to develop an orphanage, establish a *bekam* (alternative medicine) clinic, acupuncture and herbal shop. One wanted to open a salon for Muslims, open food stalls, do catfish farming, open a grocery store, cake shop, and Muslim fashion store.

I've always wanted to have my own business, like a soup stall or something, now many people stop by, the location is right by the road side. (A, 28)

I think more into the health area. (TI, 43)

[…] I want to have a house, run a business, I want to take sewing courses so that when my husband comes out, i can sew for people, I also want to, go to a bekam clinic, or herbal shop, if God willing, we'll have the fund, certain jobs, so my husband works, and I mean I work in the house, take care of the children, no need to go out often. (Z, 17)

Until now my kid doesn't know his father is in prison, all he knows is he's working to earn money to pay his school. I don't want to tell him, because that's not a good place. (A, 28)

The authors argue that, from the findings explained above, the wives of terrorists can be approached as the agents of change. This idea to work with wives or women in general is not new. Moghaddam (2008), for an example, argued that in an Islamic society where women are treated (almost) as equal as men can lead to diminishing the power of Islamic fundamentalists. Moreover, he stated that "the transformation of the role of women in the Islamic family will bring about the greatest revolution in Islamic communities" (Moghaddam, 2008, p. 166). In this matter, and putting the focus on countering radicalization, the wives can help to guide their husbands to care more about the future of the family, and to make their husbands understand that such terrorism activities would only make non-Muslims perceive Muslims as more negative.

THE RISE OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM AND WAYS IN LEADING THEM TO BE TOLERANT

Religious Fundamentalism and Islamic Fundamentalism

Religious fundamentalism is a movement that attracts much attention from social scientists, including psychology. The term was first used to describe tension in conservative Protestants in the United Stat between 1870 and 1925. The current wave of fundamentalism appeared after the 1970s, among others in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, North America, and Asia. Fundamentalism was found not only in religions like Islam and Christianity, but also in Hinduism, Sikhism, neo-Confucianism, Buddhism, and Judaism (Emerson & Hartman, 2006).

The emergence of religious fundamentalism is a response to modernism and secularism in the West which separates state and religion. Modernism has brought a wave of separation between religion and social affairs (secularism). One view is that religion only regulates private areas, while social affairs are

not to be mixed with religion. Some religious groups do not agree to this. According to them, religion must be present in all human affairs, be it private or social, including state affairs.

Religious fundamentalists are people who are fanatical about their religion, who believe that religious norms and values are the absolute truth (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992) and (Hood, Hill, & Williamson, 2005). Emerson & Hartman (2006) define fundamentalists as a group who wants religion to be practiced in purity, even though they stated that it's not easy to define fundamentalism without understanding its relation to modernism.

The most visible action of purification (puritanism) is the rejection of sources other than the sacred text and the teachings of the prophet and the style of following the prophet. For example, consider Islamic fundamentalist groups who reject traditions that are not mentioned in the Quran or hadith. In Indonesia, for example, there are traditions of *tahlil*, *dzikir* after prayers, and visiting the graves of family members. In behavior and appearance, the fundamentalists try to resemble the Prophet as closely as possible.

Viewed from the perspective of organization, according to Emerson & Hartman (2006) there are nine characteristics of religious fundamentalist groups that can be categorized into ideological and organizational:

- **Ideological:** (1) Reactivity to the marginalization of religion: maintaining religious traditions that are condisered to be eroded and attacked by the process of modernization and secularisation; (2) Selectivity: the fundamentalist group selects and reshapes religious traditions, especially tradition aspects that distinguish it from the mainstream groups; (3) Dualistic worldview: good and evil, light and darkness; (4) Absolutism and innerancy: the sacred text is absolute and true one hundred percent, accurate in all its parts; (5) Millenialism dan messianism: a miraculous and holy end of history. In the end the suffering will end, evil will be defeated, and triumph will be achieved
- **Organizational:** (1) Chosen membership: as the ones who are called to carry out the sacred mission to defend religion; (2) Sharp boundaries: either fundamentalist or not. Guarded, true, follower of Allah, defender of the faith, or not; (3) Authoritarian organization: usually organized by a charismatic leader, and the rest are followers. The specific leader is chosen by God, have a supernatural quality and and a special access to God, virtuous, a role model for followers, has followed a special training, and someone who master the sacred texts; (4) Behavioral requirements: elaborate and specific. There are rules for speech, clothing, sexuality, how to drink and eat, family, children, and other general behavior.

In many findings, religious fundamentalism has become an important factor in the emergence of violence and terrorism based on religion. For example, see (Pech & Slade, 2006) and (Taylor & Horgan, 2001). Karen Armstrong (2000) in the foreword of her book, *The Battle for God,* stated that the implementation of fundamentalist movements is sometimes surprising. They kill people in the mosque, kill doctors and nurses working in abortion clinics, kill the president, and overthrow strong government.

Altemeyer (2003) found that religious fundamentalism correlates with religious ethnocentrism. More often, fundamentalist group judge other groups with their own values and standards. They also show hostility to homosexuals and are prejudiced toward different races and ethnic minorities. This finding appears to be related to the results of the study conducted by Johnson, Rowatt, & LaBouff (2012), which stated that fundamentalist groups tend to have a high level of ingroup favoritism.

In Islamic groups, studies have shown that Islamic fundamentalists have a high level of brotherhood (Putra & Sukabdi, 2013). They feel a responsibility to help fellow Muslims who are in distress. That feeling intensifies if the distress involves non-Muslim actors, such as in the Muslim-Christian conflicts in Ambon and Poso, and the Palestine-Israel war. Their help can be in the form of fundraising to going to war.

Surveys have demonstrated that, compared to other believers, Muslims tend to have a high scale of religious fundamentalism (Muluk, Sumaktoyo, & Ruth, 2013) and (Putra & Sukabdi, 2014). Indonesia is also known as the most populous Muslim country in the world. Based on data findings, Indonesia is considered to be a fertile ground for recruitment and the spread of terrorist ideologies. Therefore, it would be a serious threat if Indonesians do not find proper solution and develop prevention efforts to tackle the spread of radical ideologies.

Leading Islamic Fundamentalism to Reject Terrorism and Become Tolerant

There is evidence showing that not all Islamic fundamentalists support and involve terrorist activities. Instead, despite having the belief that an ideal state is the one using God's law, i.e., Islamic law, many fundamentalist activists use a nonviolent approach in achieving their goal. With this evidence, it is understood that there are two categories of Islamic fundamentalists. One uses violence as one of their strategic tools, and the other rejects violence and uses non-violent approaches.

A study conducted by Rothschild, Abdollahi, and Psyczynski (2009) revealed compelling contradictory findings on religious fundamentalism. In one experiment group, Islamic fundamentalism (Study 3) was found to be associated with hostility toward outgroups (i.e., Westerners). However, in another experiment group, Islamic fundamentalism[3] was not found to support hostility; it occurred in a group where Islamic fundamentalists were reminded of compassionate values in Quranic verses.

It is literally known that there are contradictory explanations in Quranic verses in terms of how Quran describes other religious groups. For example, about a reward of good deeds from non-Muslims: in one verse (Quran 9:17), it is explained that there will be reward for non-Muslims:

It is not for such as join gods with Allah, to visit or maintain the mosques of Allah while they witness against their own souls to infidelity. The works of such bear no fruit: In Fire shall they dwell (Quran 9:17)

Another verse (Quran 99:7) explains that there will be a reward for non-Muslims "and whoso doeth good an atom's weight will see it then." Other verses explaining whether Muslims can be friends with Christians are also found to be contradictory: one verse (Quran 5:82) shows that Muslims can have Christians as friends:

… and nearest among them in love to the believers wilt thou find those who say, "We are Christians": because amongst these are men devoted to learning and men who have renounced the world, and they are not arrogant. (Quran 5:82)

Whereas another verse (Quran 5:51) explains otherwise:

Take not the Jews and the Christians for friends. They are friends one to another. He among you who taketh them for friends is (one) of them. Lo! Allah guideth not wrongdoing folk. (Quran 5:51)

Despite the contradictory contents within Quranic verses, Rothschild et al.'s findings (2009) can give understanding that Islamic fundamentalists may see other religious groups as positive when compassionate values of the Quran are highlighted.

Moving back to the relationship between Islamic fundamentalism and support to terrorism activities, Putra and Sukabdi (2014) also revealed two categories of Islamic fundamentalists: the ones who support terrorism and the ones who reject terrorism. In this aspect, the phenomenon of different results from Islamic fundamentalism can be viewed as different interpretations of certain conditions. It is true that Islamic fundamentalists have a goal to establish Islamic law. However, it is also possibly accepted that the struggle to establish Islamic law can be done in peaceful ways. Based on this assumption, Putra and Sukabdi hypothesized that the relationship between Islamic fundamentalism and support for acts of terrorism is moderated by the belief in establishing Islam peacefully and rationalizing violent action. The findings of their research showed that support for acts of terrorism were found in fundamentalists who hold low beliefs in establishing Islamic law in Indonesia in a peaceful way, and who believe that the use of violence is justified if it is needed for achieving their goal. However, with the ones who believe that a peaceful way is still possible, and that the use of violence is not justified, the fundamentalists did not show support for acts of terrorism. In this sense, Putra and Sukabdi's findings indicate that how Islamic fundamentalists react to the situation they face depends on how they interpret Islam in the Indonesian context.

Humans are understood as rational and social animals whose perceptions and behaviors about a social object are influenced by others. Unconsciously, humans also need others in order to survive and reach happiness, making them have a sense of belonging to a group.

In terms of identification with a group, Islamic fundamentalists were found to be highly bonded to their group. Islamic fundamentalists tend to regard their group as more important than their personal life. In an interview, Putra & Sukabdi (2013) found that, for them, if outgroup members insulted them as a person, it can be accepted and forgiven, but if the outgroup members insulted his religion, insulted Muslims, then it cannot be tolerated. "I cannot stand still if my religion is insulted."

Islamic fundamentalists are also considered fanatical about their group and blindly believe that values and norms developed from the group are the only truth and guidance for humans to live in life. This is the reason why fundamentalists tend to derogate other religious members. In some regards however, Putra and Sukabdi (2016) were seeking to find ways to make Islamic fundamentalists see others as positive by using their strong connection to the ingroup. The question was whether Islamic fundamentalists can see outgroup members in a positive way when they think most Muslim fellows see outgroup members as friends, or can they be trusted. Interestingly, the findings supported the assumption. With this finding, leading Islamic fundamentalists to see non-Muslims in a positive way can be possible by utilizing their fanaticism with their ingroup, that is, by making them perceive that most Muslim fellows see a non-Muslim group as positive (i.e., as friends or can be trusted).

CONCLUSION

As it has been seen, there are several ways to disengage the *jihadists* from terrorism activities a lead Islamic fundamentalists to perceive other religious members in positive ways. As the authors have explained, a number of studies have concentrated on countering radical ideology and ended up with little success. With this chapter, the authors have demonstrated that, by making Islamic fundamentalists not

think about war and reminding them about the sense of humanity, success is promising in tackling terrorism and radical behaviors.

So now, let us concentrate to discuss what is in the mind of the *jihadists*. Putra and Sukabdi (2013) pointed out that it is not without reason that terrorism activities were carried out in Indonesia. The *jihadists* are those who are actively involved in spreading Islamic values. In a condition where a place is interpreted as a peaceful place, those *jihadists* will not use violence or coercion as part of their activities. According to them, violence will only be used when they are considered to be attacked by the enemy. It is then that they interpret the place where they live as in a state of war, and as such the use of violence is justified.

But what will happen if the *jihadists* can be brought away from the idea of struggling for Islamic values with arms and instead talk about what Islam can do to solve everyday problems? As explained above, this model of activities had been conducted by Sarwono and colleagues in four project activities, from 2011 to 2015, and the project seemed to be successful. From a total of 145 participants, only two of them re-engaged in terror activities. From this finding, what can be understood is that most of the *jihadists* have a drive to propagate their idea about Islam. Instead of controlling their drive to propagate (doing *da'wah*), Sarwono and colleagues decided to ask the *jihadists* to do *da'wah* about Islam, but with peaceful contents. They were asked to voice a peaceful Islam with the competence or skill they have or are capable of. These activities are considered to lead the *jihadists* to use non-violent activities, through which it can increase their empathy toward others.

Moreover, in terms of convicted terrorists, the authors have also presented that highlighting dialogs related to humanity and peace were able to increase the level of cognitive complexity. This finding is important in the sense that, instead of arguing about the *jihadist* ideology and wrongdoings, creating openness and flexibility to accept other opinions are more feasible in discussing a peaceful society. This finding, of course, may lead us to suggest that disengagement program in the prison is more successful with a "humanity" soft approach than it would be with a coercion (hard) approach.

To address a still more successful counter-violent extremism programs, touching the wives was considered to be important as well to point how the role of women is important in countering radicalism (see Moghaddam, 2008). At least, if the wives can be embraced, they can help to 1) increase their husband's empathy by talking about the family's future or 2) prevent radicalization of their children.

Furthermore, in dealing with religious fundamentalists, it is understood that through their strong connection with Muslim identity, making them see that their fellow Muslims perceive non-Muslims in a positive way is one way to make Islamic fundamentalists more positive in perceiving non-Muslims (Putra & Sukabdi, 2016). It suggests that, rather than trying to reduce fundamentalists' ideology as well as their goal, leading them to perceive fellow Muslims as non-Muslims in a positive way is considered to be more realistic.

In the end, the general argument here is aimed to inform that 1) the authors realize that modifying people's ideology is undoubtedly difficult, so that other ways to manage radical ideology and radical behavior are considered vital. 2) So far, the authors note that designing a program which tends to increase the sense of humanity and friendship among the *jihadists* and Islamic fundamentalists may indeed give a more promising result, in which they could be led to see others to be more positive. It is hoped these approaches can give a new insight on how to deal with Islamic terrorism and fundamentalism, and can be applied in other places outside Indonesia.

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ENDNOTES

[1] Post Prison (PP) is a social intervention program under Sarlito W. Sarwono. PP ran from 2011 to 2015.

[2] Most convicted terrorists we interviewed gave statements in a negative way of how BNPT treated and forced them to accept BNPT's point of views.

[3] In the study, the mean of religious fundamentalism among Muslim Shia participants was 6.84 on a 9-point scale where the lowest religious fundamentalism score was 5.42. In this term, because the mean of religious fundamentalism scale was higher than the mid-point of the scale (i.e., 4.5), participants of this study could be categorized as religious fundamentalists.

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